STS3301 Paper Week 13: Difference between revisions
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Reading Anderson after Kevles and Rhodes, I mostly think of anti-reductionism as a defense of scientists who do ''not'' work on cosmogony and particle physics, logic and math, against a claim that their work is less important, or, more practically, less deserving of funding. | Reading Anderson after Kevles and Rhodes, I mostly think of anti-reductionism as a defense of scientists who do ''not'' work on cosmogony and particle physics, logic and math, against a claim that their work is less important, or, more practically, less deserving of funding. | ||
Anderson claims that each level of complexity in his hierarchy of science requires its own resources that are intuitive for the workers on that level. On a solution of nuclear structure: "it was simply an inspiration, based, to be sure, on everyday intuition, which suddenly fitted everything together." (p. 395) Compare this to Wise's presentation of William Thomson's two-sphere problem of 1845. (<bib>Wise:1989</bib> pp. 263-266) The resources, according to Wise, are brought to the science, "focusing" a social guiding light on a technical problem. The actor chooses from among the possible explanations, co-creating a discourse with other scientists using and guiding common language. | |||
==Readings== | ==Readings== | ||
Revision as of 19:39, 28 November 2009
Response to readings for STS 3301.
Diversification of the curriculum is necessary for training. That diversification must include a weaning, as in Laughlin's example of electrical engineering students "no longer required to learn the laws of electricity." (p. 208) So, the pursuit of science or engineering, split by Laughlin between parts and systems supposedly can be redirected by adjusting the measure of parts or systems in the curriculum.
Are the organizational laws really the children of the microscopic and mechanical laws? Isn't the family relationship more like a marriage, wed by Maxwell, Boltzmann, and grudgingly Schrödinger? Has Laughlin studied the history of statistics any further than I have, or am I misinterpreting the taming of chance?
Reading Anderson after Kevles and Rhodes, I mostly think of anti-reductionism as a defense of scientists who do not work on cosmogony and particle physics, logic and math, against a claim that their work is less important, or, more practically, less deserving of funding.
Anderson claims that each level of complexity in his hierarchy of science requires its own resources that are intuitive for the workers on that level. On a solution of nuclear structure: "it was simply an inspiration, based, to be sure, on everyday intuition, which suddenly fitted everything together." (p. 395) Compare this to Wise's presentation of William Thomson's two-sphere problem of 1845. (<bib>Wise:1989</bib> pp. 263-266) The resources, according to Wise, are brought to the science, "focusing" a social guiding light on a technical problem. The actor chooses from among the possible explanations, co-creating a discourse with other scientists using and guiding common language.
Readings
<bib>Laughlin:2005</bib>
<bib>Dyson:1979</bib>
<bib>Anderson:1972</bib>
