STS3301 Final essay
December, 2009, for STS 3301.
Position to argue
A fruitful science has required certain qualities in science education, including foresight, interdisciplinary work, care and precision, confidence-building, and mentoring. History offers examples of cases where any of these have been lacking.
Historians, at least in what I've read so far, largely have not shown how scientists are trained to act in the ways historians have found them acting.
A breath of fresh air, to a traditionalist, seems like a simoom.
What style(s) of historiography are best for studying training in science?
Is studying the top of the hierarchy good enough?
The history we've read in our course is that of the most important natural philosophers and physicists. Are we allowed to say anything about the field as a whole based only on the top of the field? Consider that most often the top philosophers are also at research universities or in other teaching positions. Not only are they respected by researchers in their field, they are respected by the educators in their field. Thus, scientific leaders are educational leaders. Not necessarily the best teachers, they are an important part of educational decision-making.
- A list of leaders of both education and science we've studied
- Ludwig Boltzmann
- Vannevar Bush
- Augustin-Louis Cauchy
- Philipp Lenard
- James Clerk Maxwell
- Albert Abraham Michelson
- Robert A. Millikan
- J. Robert Oppenheimer
- Max Planck
- Isidor Isaac Rabi
- Henry Augustus Rowland
- Arnold Sommerfeld
- Peter Guthrie Tait
- Joseph John Thomson
- William Thomson
- Wilhelm Wien
Is the influence of these top scientist/educators limited to PhD students? Is PhD-level, top-tier or not, education affecting introductory level education?
How can the historian identify good or bad training?
Are historians approaching training as well as they are approaching the generation of theories and experiments?
We have seen Crosbie and Wise identify the resources scientists have selected to inspire or to buttress their work. A scientist might draw on poetry, industry, or the bible. But how do scientists learn to do this? A mentor may impress on a student the importance of thinking over a problem on a stroll (Bohr), considering a machine (Thomson), exercising the body to keep the wits sharp (Maxwell and "mathletes").The way that educators show their students how to draw on social resources and the way they demonstrate to their students which selections from their milieu are proper and acceptable are probably not well documented. If so, then some very important part of training is lost to the historian.
Conversely, scientists affect the popular realm often through invention and interpretation. How has that been taught, or can historians find out? What made William Thomson such a popular engineer and inventor? When it is assumed that good scientists make good inventors or good professors, and they turn out not to be so, is that a failure of training or a presumptuous expectation?
Where has training gone wrong?
A mistake repeated over and over again by mentors from Boyle and Newton was stating that we make no hypothesis. Boyle claimed to produce "only facts," not a hypothetical vacuum, but if he farmed out most of his experiments, he most certainly was interpreting facts as results came to his desk. What these leaders might have more appropriately stated is that they didn't want to over-hypothesize, to stray too far from accepted theories.
Another mistake has been to claim that science lies apart from society. The truth we care about is the truth we seek, and that seeking is mostly inseparable from society. That's a good thing, because scientists are appreciated for working on questions society cares about. During great wars, war and peace are what society cares about. The Superconducting Super Collider was not well-connected to broader and durable norms in America, so the characterization of it as a cement-filled boondoggle was too difficult to mitigate.
Good training may separate strands of study for students, then show how to re-weave those strands with the other pursuits of society. Sometimes students experience that separation into disciplines, but then break off or break out before learning how to do the re-integration. Frayn shows Heisenberg as a protégé of Bohr's who broke out of re-integration due to his own grandiosity but also due to the implosion of normal relations during the war. In the play, a war-time Heisenberg suggests Bohr could go skiing again with him, mindless of the seriousness of the implosion, the importance not lost on the Bohr's.
What have we learned about training?
In Kevles, Frayn, and Stanley, we see the struggle, between the wars, with the idea that science lacked enough consideration of ethics. As scientists were claiming wartime and or industrial powers, they often, at least in perception, overshot society's bounds of acceptability. The humanists muttered "I told you so" at every sign of hubris from the scientists. Meanwhile, science sometimes was a scapegoat for problems of urbanization, social unrest, the fog of war, and other issues. Was it a gross oversight in the pedagogy of physics in the early 20th century that it did not address ethics sufficiently, if at all?
Boltzmann expresses his sense of introductory physics, as a traditionally decorated entry hall. In my mind he creates a picture of a narrowing of possibilities, a narrow hall, before students are allowed into the widening tabernacle of advanced physics. That widening tabernacle, based more on empiricism and statistics is leaving mechanistic views with the servants at the entrance. But at the same time, Cambridge middle mathematicians are enlarging the doors, giving younger students a taste of the most rigorous, most advanced of the mechanistic views. Who built the bridge between the height of mechanics and advanced physics? Kevles retells Oppenheimer's youth, of his academic self-doubt. Here and there, we hear about Sommerfeld setting students straight, on the road to the most advanced physics. What was his skill?
(move this paragraph to the start?) The narrowing of possibilities echoes in the historical inquiries about why scientists acted the way they did. Start with a person with infinite possibilities; introduce all their knowable background; apply their influences, their forced situations, their geographical limitations, their demanding mentors, the social and regulatory structure of their organizations and governments; limit their funding; prevent cooperation due to wars, nationalism, bigotry, class-distinctions; put clouds above their telescopes and corrode their cables; drown or gas their children; give them a jealous superior or an irrelevant job; pester them about the religion of their grandparents; base their prestige not on their accomplishments but on the priority of them. How much freedom of choice is left? Kistiakowski wrote that he went to Los Alamos "unwillingly," and Heisenberg painted himself cornered. We study the great ones, the ones that overcome our expectations or overshoot their bounds. Surely Kistiakowski and Heisenberg retained some control, and if so, some great responsibility.
So, how may a successful scientist extend their work beyond the sea of limitations? We have seen several qualities:
Foresight, as in John Wheeler's concerns about fission-poisoning isotopes. (Rhodes, p. 560)
Precision, as in Rowland's gratings allowing for discovery of fine structure of spectra.
Interdisciplinary work
Ideas travel with objects
The Torricelli tube and the barometer, in manifesting enlightenment, carried social status also. Boyle and fellow philosophers and the gentry created a feedback cycle of social status, allowing the instruments to cross between studying the nature of the atmosphere and the social meaning of the atmosphere. By making the instruments important in both these pursuits, philosophers and instrument-makers may have at the same time maintained the high esteem of philosophy while making its pursuit more socially acceptable. [Is this right? check Golinsky]
What evidence is missing?
We cannot make arguments for physics education much beyond the purposes of the physics education we have studied. If we have only identified the success of training mainstream, Nobel-laureate-level physicists, then perhaps we have very little to say about training the general public in physics.
What is the role of physics educators in the history of science?
On the one hand, the system of education at Cambridge University determined what kind of teaching could be successful. On the other hand, engineering teachers in revolution-era France, in altering the curriculum, determined what kind of learning would happen. Pedagogues, along with researchers, have steered the course of physical science.
How much have physicists, or even the general public, been able to steer the course of physical science using the schools? How much of the change in natural philosophy over time is attributable to the rendered curriculum, and how much of that change can be attributed to foresight of those in power?
Or, to the contrary, how much has the canonization of the curriculum prevented progress in physical understanding?
Consider Ludwig Boltzmann. By the end of the 19th century, to Boltzmann and many other leading physicists, the mechanical world view was the canon. Pushing on one side away from the canon, physicists were considering a Mach-inspired direction towards discarding uneconomical hypotheses about metaphysics, and in another direction physicists were considering fields and electrodynamics as alternatives. Boltzmann would defend the mechanical world-view, but in reconciliation aid the early quantum work with his statistical methods. He would maintain that wherever physics led around the Fin-de-Siècle, it needed its mechanical roots, its tradition, as an important guide.
Advanced as he was, did Boltzmann embody a reluctance to change in world view that prevented him from continuing to further the field?
What constitutes evidence of a good teacher? a good curriculum?
Much positive outcome seems to be attributed in the historical record to international exchanges of scientists and students. (readings: Kevles, Seth, ... subjects:Sommerfeld, Copenhagen and Bohr, NRC/IRC fellowships, I. I. Rabi)
A good teacher must resist canonization. Consider Sommerfeld's 'magic' and it's critics. Good training introduces student to the field without limiting the students' ability to push the boundaries of the field in fruitful directions. Magic and mystery are important to many of the quantum theorists especially. Rhodes reported that I. I. Rabi thought the expanse of physics was lost on students who were intent on technique; Rabi valued "the mystery of it" and its depth, rather than the predictability and reduction of knowledge.(<bib>Rhodes:1986</bib>, 279-280)
A good teacher gives the student confidence to draw on new resources.
A good curriculum is synergistic with other fields.
Is training mostly reproduction and emulation, with a haphazard touch of freedom in the hopes of creativity?
A good trainer should identify and bring to the surface more and more tacit knowledge. A good curriculum should acknowledge an develop tacit knowledge. Working with instruments is only part of this task; appreciating the range of possibilities in a study is also part of tacit knowledge. Consider Faraday, Bohr, Joule.
Conclusion
Physicists who used an elitist approach to attempt to keep physics pure or independent did so not for the sake of purity but for the sake of power. But, by gathering power, physicists changed the course of history, including their own; in fact, they interwove physics with social power. In education, leaders should realize the workings of change, learn to accept change and skip elitism.